Considering issues of the functional equivalence of the gender role battery of ISSP, across time and space, we consider whether the apparent trend reversal in egalitarianism is artefact or real. The paper analyzes the change of gender role attitudes from 1988 through 2002 along two dimensions: the consequences of female labor force participation for the children and a general gender role ideology. Each dimension is measured both by two core items which can be regarded as equivalent across countries and by an index consisting of three items one of which shows considerable problems of equivalence. We focus on those countries for which we have data for all three points in time (1988, 1994, and 2002), i.e. Austria, western Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Hungary. While in countries that have established long time series for gender role attitudes a liberal trend could be demonstrated to operate at least from the 70ies through the 90ies, scholars are discussing a possible trend reversal in more recent times. Using the two-item index, what is revealed is less a trend reversal than a leveling off of the liberal trend. This is particularly true of Great Britain and the United States, which were already characterized by less traditional attitudes; whereas in most of the countries with more traditional attitudes, the liberal trend is continuing (in particular: Austria and western Germany). However, using the three-item index, a marked trend reversal is revealed in many countries. This trend reversal, however, is not real but a methodological artifact.
research, at least, the perspective has to be extended beyond these other elements of the survey to the everyday knowledge of respondents in general. To the extent that social realities differ between different cultures, respondents will use different assumptions to determine the meaning of questions.
We examine 14 years of attitudinal change in gender roles. The ISSP data allow us to examine attitude trends at the aggregate level, with surveys in Austria, western Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Hungary conducted in 1988 Hungary conducted in , 1994 Hungary conducted in , and 2002 . We know from previous research that attitudes have become steadily more supportive of women's dual work and family roles (Scott, 1990; Scott et al., 1996) . However, there is suggestion of a more recent backlash (e.g. Scott, 1999) . There has been a wealth of theoretical and empirical work, particularly in the US, which has highlighted potential factors that influence social change in the gender role domain, including generational or birth cohort effects, educational advances, gender, changes in women's labor force participation, changes in partnership formation, and different religious traditions (e.g. Thornton et al., 1983; Mason and Lu, 1988; Bumpass, 1990) . Change in these variables should also affect change in gender role attitudes. Thus, in order to gauge net change as revealed by the different measurements, these variables should be controlled.
Schema-based framing effects: Can working mothers have a good relationship with their children?
Schema-based framing effects are generated by an automatic activation of mental structures. This can be triggered by particular informational components in some countries. What is then important is that items holistically activate one or more images. Schema-based framing effects can result in items being understood in ways not intended by the researcher. This is true for the item, "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (Warm relationship). Public debate on the effects on children of women working, or criticism of women who do go out to work when children are at home, determines how salient one or the other reading is Braun, 1998 Braun, , 2003 Braun, , 2006 . If debate has focussed on criticizing women, even nontraditional respondents may understand the item to mean just that, and their response would then indicate that working mothers are not to blame. Respondents in former communist countries, in particular, are likely to read the item this way. In these countries, labor force participation of women was compulsory in spite of very traditional attitudes among the population, and remains necessary today for economic reasons. This interpretation is also likely in some continental European countries where ostracizing working mothers has a long tradition, for instance, in western Germany. In Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries, however, the second reading is more salient. In these countries it is unnecessary to defend working mothers, because there is less criticism of this group. In these cultural contexts, respondents then focus on the effects of working mothers on children. In AngloSaxon countries this is due to the fact that the family is regarded as a private matter and economic independence and prosperity are important societal values. Thus, it comes as no surprise that respondents in former socialist and conservative European countries show extremely 'nontraditional' attitudes with Warm relationship compared to items more explicitly directed at the effects on the children (Child suffers and Family suffers). See Table 1 for the question wording of items. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, however, there is not much difference between the items. Attitude or opinion: Is being a housewife as fulfilling as working for pay? Item characteristics are important in guiding the interpretation by respondents. Items aiming at attitudes should be answered by the respondent indicating the position he or she has with regard to an object on a continuum from positive to negative (Borg, 1994) . They require an evaluation of an object by the respondent. On the contrary, items which aim at opinions concern perceptions without reference to the evaluation by the respondent. Problems are likely to result if the interpretation of a given item does not proceed in the same frame (attitude or opinion) in different countries. For attitudinal items, respondents with extreme attitudes should produce extreme scale values. For opinions which relate to the perceived characteristics of an object this is not the case. Thus, responses to opinion questions do not necessarily tell us anything about attitudes.
At least one of the items of the ISSP battery, "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay", can be interpreted by respondents in both ways: as either an attitude or an opinion. If it is interpreted as asking for an opinion the results cannot be interpreted in the sense of more or less 'traditional', because egalitarian respondents might be convinced that the majority of women are satisfied with their role as a housewife. What is important is that researchers usually interpret the item as an attitude and thus include this item in indices designed to measure gender ideology. The main explanatory variable for the interpretation of the item Housewife as fulfilling is the general level of liberality of the countries with regard to gender roles. An interpretation as an opinion item should be more likely in liberal countries in which egalitarian respondents do not perceive themselves as a minority. Braun (2003) shows that egalitarian respondents in western Germany treat the item more as an attitudinal item while Canadians treat it more as an opinion item. Respondents who can be regarded as traditional when measured by other items achieve relatively high means (indicating egalitarianism) in Canada, and means for egalitarian respondents are low in comparison to other countries. Germany shows a big difference between traditional and egalitarian respondents. The correlations between Housewife as fulfilling and a benchmark item ("A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family") are much lower in Canada. Comparing the extreme cases -eastern Germany and Canada -one can conclude the following: The most traditional respondents have the same mean in both countries on Housewife as fulfilling, but for the least traditional the mean in eastern Germany is nearly 1.5 scale points above that for Canada. Thus, there is a considerable 'non-uniform bias ' (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997) .
The item Housewife as fulfilling was originally conceived for measuring an attitude and -when used to compute an index for the dimension gender ideology -is used in that sense. While in a literal, semantic meaning it might more readily be regarded as an item aiming at an opinion, respondents interpret and use it in both ways, as either an opinion or an attitude. As an opinion item it will not necessarily produce responses in the full range. It can be shown empirically that the mean of the item -first for the younger respondents in the less traditional countries -converges to the middle point of the scale, which might be modulated by a higher or lower estimation of laborforce participation for both genders. The use of the middle position means that the item does not discriminate between traditional and non-traditional respondents.
Including the item Housewife as fulfilling in an index for the dimension gender ideology creates just 'white noise', i.e. existing country differences are blurred or even reversed. Countries with a high general level of liberality are systematically at a disadvantage, because the interpretation as an opinion item leads to lower values. In addition, correlations with potentially explicative variables are reduced.
Data and Methods
We use data of the three waves of the ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles model which was fielded in 1988 , 1994 , and 2002 (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1990 , 2004 . We focus on those countries for which we have data for all three points in time, i.e. Austria, western Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands and Hungary. From the gender role battery we select the two main dimensions: the consequences of female labor force participation for the children and a general gender ideology (thus neglecting the economic consequences dimension). There are three items per dimension which could be compared across the three waves. We measure each dimensions by two indices: one is based on only two core items which can be regarded as equivalent across countries and the other on all three indicators, the third of which is problematic as the foregoing discussion has shown.
-- Table 1 about here --The first index for the consequences of female labor force participation for the children is based on the two items "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" and "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a fulltime job". The second index includes, in addition, the item "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work". This item was found not to work in an equivalent way in different countries.
The first index of gender ideology is based on the item "A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children" and "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family". The second index includes, in addition, the item "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay". Again, here are equivalence problems in different countries.
Response alternatives are "strongly agree", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree" and "strongly disagree". The responses are coded such that high values denote non-traditional or egalitarian responses. We compute indices for both dimensions using the non-missing values of the relevant items.
The 2002 data from the United States pose a problem insofar as -by a mishap -the fourth and fifth of the response categories were collapsed when saving the data. According to the recommendation in the ISSP codebook, this response category is assigned the value 5. This means that the traditionality level might be somewhat underestimated. However, though data are not strictly comparable with those from the previous surveys we are confident that the error incurred is rather small. First, with this coding, the leveling off of an earlier liberal trend in the American data (observed on the basis of the General Social Survey (GSS) time series and its precursors in the 60ies and 70ies), visible between 1988 and 1994, is extended to the period from 1994 and 2002 (Scott, 2008) . Second, the same lack of a liberal trend is observable in other Anglo-Saxon countries, too (with the notable exception of Ireland).
We will look at means for the different countries across the waves of the survey first, separately for the two dimensions and for the two measurements devices. We will then regress the dependent variables on the country dummies to see whether country differences are comparable across measures. Then we estimate two sets of regressions on explanatory variables for each of the countries separately. In the first set, only the waves are included as explanatory variables. The gross time trend results from that. The second set of regressions include additional explanatory variables. This allows us to answer the question whether one can assume the existence of a trend reversal, once other relevant variables have been controlled for.
We represent the years the surveys were conducted by two dummy variables for 1994 and 2002. Cohorts are also represented by dummy variables. We start with the birth cohort 1959-1970 the members of which were 18-29 years in 1988, and continue in 10 year intervals through to the cohort born before 1929. We add a younger cohort in 1994 (which comprises six birth years, matching the time lapse between the first and the second survey) and another one for 2002 (which comprises 8 birth years). These two additional cohorts are used only for the descriptive analysis, but not for the multivariate models. In the latter only those birth cohorts are included for which we have data for all three surveys. In the multivariate analyses we use, in addition to year of survey and cohort, the following variables: Education is measured by two dummy variables for intermediary education (intermediary and upper secondary education) and high education (at least some university studies), and those with only lower secondary education form the baseline. Never married is a dummy variable contrasting the never married with all the other marital status categories. Female is a dummy variable (with men as the baseline category). Woman working measures for a female respondent whether the respondent has either a full-time or a part-time job (all the others form the baseline); for a male respondent it measures whether his spouse or partner is in the labor force. We also include an interaction effect between female and woman working. Finally, we use three dummies for religion: other religion, Protestant and no religion, where Catholics form the baseline.
Work status of the spouse/partner was not collected in the Netherlands in all surveys. As a consequence, the theoretically important variable measuring labor force participation of the partner could not be constructed for male respondents. We decided to estimate slightly different models in the Netherlands. Again, we are confident that the error is not dramatic, as the strongest effect in the other countries pertains to the own labor force participation for the woman. Table 2 presents the mean values of the consequence dimension, measured by the two alternative indices, for the seven countries as they change from 1988 through 2002. According to the two-item index for consequences of women's labor force participation, i.e. whether pre-school children or the family suffer if the mother is gainfully employed, the United States was the most egalitarian country in 1988, with Great Britain and Ireland next. In 2002, these three countries are still ranking first, and the differences between them have largely vanished, with most change in the liberal direction having occurred in Ireland. In addition, the distance to Austria and western Germany has clearly been reduced. Actually, there has not been any change from 1988 to 2002 in the United States, and small changes in Great Britain and the Netherlands are observable only between the first two surveys. By contrast, in Austria, western Germany, and Ireland most of the change has taken place between 1994 and 2002. In Hungary, there is a traditional trend with an ensuing liberal trend since 1994.
Results

Country Differences in Trends
-- Table 2 about here --The three-item index reveals a higher level of non-traditional attitudes everywhere, but this is most pronounced in Austria, western Germany, and Hungary. This leads to a narrowing of the gap between countries. However, the change over time is hardly affected by the choice of measurement. Table 3 presents the corresponding information for gender ideology. The twoitem index shows slightly stronger change in some countries than was the case for the consequences dimension. Great Britain and the Netherlands were the most egalitarian countries in 1988, immediately followed by the United States. In 2002, the Netherlands share the first place with western Germany which was markedly more traditional in 1988. Three countries, the United States, Great Britain, and Ireland are ranking second. Austria has also considerably gained ground, and the only remaining traditional country is Hungary. As far as the size of change between 1988 and 2002 is concerned, the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands show only minor differences, though these are all in an egalitarian direction. Austria, western Germany, and Ireland show a considerable liberal trend which is nearly evenly spaced between 1988 and 2002. As was the case for the consequences dimension, the trend in Hungary is curvilinear.
-- Table 3 about here --The three-item index reveals nearly the same overall level of non-traditional attitudes in all countries as the two-item index. This was different for the consequences dimension. However, the change over time is flatter in most countries. Table 4 shows results for regressions of the different measurements of the two dimensions on the country dummies, with western Germany serving as the baseline. These regressions are based on the pooled samples, not differentiating between the single waves.
Country differences
-- Table 4 about here --For the consequences dimension, both the two-and the three-item indices show that Austria and Hungary are even lower in non-traditionality than Germany, and that Great Britain and the United States are the most nontraditional countries. However, for those countries which show less traditional attitudes than Germany, the distances to the latter are markedly reduced, when the three-item index is used.
For gender ideology the two-item index shows that it is again Austria and Hungary which are on a lower level than Germany. Ireland is on the same level, and Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands are less traditional than western Germany. Turning to the three-level index, it is obvious that the distance between western Germany and those countries, which are less traditional than the latter when measured by the two-level index, are reduced. Table 5 shows regressions of the different dependent variables on the survey wave, separately for the single countries.
Gross change over time in the single countries
-- Table 5 about here --For the consequences dimension, both the two-and the three-item indices reveal gross change to be quite low in all countries, in particular in Great Britain and the United States. Differences between both indices are negligeable in most countries.
For gender ideology, when the 2-item measure is used, change in Britain, the US, and the Netherlands is small over the 1988-2002 period. However, no trend reversals or a flattening of the liberal trend is observable. When the 3-item measure is used, change in the liberal direction is smaller almost everywhere than with the 2-item measure. In addition, a flattening of the liberal trend appears in the United States and in Britain, but no trend reversal. For gender ideology, explained variance is higher than for the consequences dimension and is somewhat higher in most of the countries when the 2-item measure is used.
Net change over time in the single countries
So far we have only looked at gross change in the different countries. However, it is not possible to get a comprehensive picture regarding net change in the different countries without using multivariate analysis. Thus, we have to control for changes in the composition of the populations in terms of women's increasing participation in the labor force, the expansion of higher education, and changes in secularisation. It is also important to control for the different sizes of cohorts and, in particular, the change of their sizes over time. For example, the cohort born before 1929 was bigger in 1988 than in 2002. In addition, some of the countries experienced considerable change in their age distribution due to reduced fertility. We will discuss the consequences and gender ideology dimensions in turn. Table 6 shows separate regressions for the seven countries of the consequences dimension on the year of the survey, the cohorts, education, marital status, gender, whether the woman is working, an interaction effect of working woman and gender, and religion. In these regressions, the younger cohorts added in 1994 and 2002 are not included.
Consequences dimension
-- Table 6 about here --We will first turn to the two-item measure: The coefficients for the years of the survey show that, under control of the other variables, there is no clear liberal trend discernible for both years for any country. Western Germany and Ireland show a liberal trend for 2002 and Great Britain for 1994. Austria does not show any trend at all. The Netherlands show a trend in the liberal direction in 1994, but a trend reversal thereafter. The United States show a trend in a traditional direction for both points in time. Finally, the regression for Hungary shows the curvilinear trend. The traditional trend observed here in the USin combination with the actually stable mean value on the consequence dimension over the three time periods -suggests that the Americans should have developed more liberal attitudes over the years, given the change in the socio-demographic composition of the population.
The cohorts work in roughly the same direction and with comparable strength in most of the countries. Partial exceptions are Austria, where the three oldest cohorts are not distinct, and western Germany, Great Britain, and Hungary, where the second oldest cohort is not different from the oldest. The effect of education is also similar in most countries, with the exception of Great Britain (no effect of education) and Ireland (only high education distinct from low education). Never married people are somewhat more egalitarian in four countries and women only in three countries. The main effect indicating whether the woman in the household is working for pay is significant and positive in the United States, only. However, the interaction is significant in all countries. It indicates that the effect of the woman having a paid job is bigger for a woman herself than for a husband of a working woman. Finally, while in western Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Hungary people with non Christian religions are less egalitarian, people who are not members of a church are more egalitarian everywhere, except for Great Britain and Ireland.
The three-item measure does not lead to consistently different conclusions. Table 7 shows separate regressions for the seven countries of gender ideology on the year of the survey, the cohorts, education, marital status, gender, whether the woman is working, an interaction effect of working woman and gender, and religion.
Gender ideology dimension
Again, we will first look at the two- The cohorts work in roughly the same direction and with comparable strength in all countries but Hungary, where inter-cohort differences are small. Partial exceptions are Austria where the second oldest cohort is not different from the oldest and Ireland where both cohorts are quite close. The effect of education is also similar in all of the countries, though somewhat weaker in Great Britain. Never married people are somewhat more egalitarian in three countries, only. Women are more egalitarian in all countries but the United States. The main effect indicating whether the woman in the household is working for pay is significant and positive in Great Britain, Austria, and Hungary, only. However, the interaction is significant in all countries but Hungary. It indicates, again, that the effect of having a paid job is bigger for a woman herself than for a husband of a working woman. Finally, while in western Germany, Great Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands people with non-Christian religious backgrounds are less egalitarian, people who are not members of a church are more egalitarian everywhere.
-- Table 7 about here --Using the 3-item measure, Britain and the United States show a clear trend reversal. Austria and western Germany just show a slightly smaller liberal trend for the entire period under observation. There is no change for Ireland, and for the Netherland, there is a flattening of the trend instead of a trend reversal. For Hungary, the u-curve is less pronounced. Table 8 summarizes the explained variance for both measures of the consequences dimension and gender ideology.
-- Table 8 about here --
Summary and Discussion
In this paper we have looked at different aspects of gender role change. We found that gender role attitudinal change does not support a story of revolutionary change and backlash. Interestingly, however, we do find that gender attitudes seem to show a move towards greater egalitarianism followed by retreat in some countries.
In terms of our cross-national comparison of gender role change, we found attitudes differ considerably depending on the issue. Change with regard to the perception of negative consequences of mothers' labor-force participation for the children is less pronounced than for gender ideology. In all countries less of the variance can be explained for the consequences dimension compared to gender ideology.
While for the consequences dimension there is very little change, for gender ideology there is some evidence of egalitarianism reaching a peak and retreat The leveling off of the liberal trend -or the trend reversal once the covariates are taken into account -in some of the countries investigated here (United States and Great Britain) cannot be explained as a methodological artifact, i.e. a ceiling effect.
Both the 3-item measure and controls contribute to the conclusion of trend reversal or trend flattening, in the case of gender ideology. However, the contribution of the 3-item measure to this impression is entirely a methodological artifact. The third item works in disfavor of countries such as Britain and the United States, where it is treated more as an opinion item which does not produce extreme values with extreme attitudes. Using controls is warranted and has a substantial interpretation, i.e. in the present case that no liberal trend over and above that what can be explained by sociodemographic changes can be observed.
The following consequences should be emphasized for interculturally comparative research in general: In the phase of constructing measurement devices the distinction between attitudinal and opinion items should not be given short shrift. In particular, the theoretical status of opinion items should be made explicit. What is important, is how respondents in different countries interpret an item, not the intention of the researcher. An implicit use of opinion items for the measurement of attitudes might work, but it is somewhat risky and needs continuous evaluation of the interpretation by respondents. This is especially true when the interpretation of the items depends on variables on which the countries differ and which are changing over time. A = Austria, WG = Western Germany, GB = Great Britain, US = United States, IRE = Ireland, NL = Netherlands, H = Hungary. * p < .05 A = Austria, WG = Western Germany, GB = Great Britain, US = United States, IRE = Ireland, NL = Netherlands, H = Hungary. * p < .05 
